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ABSTRACT
　クルー・リソース・マネジメント（CRM）は，航空会社における訓練ツールとして重要なものであり，
1990年代に米国で開発されて以来，運航乗務員の訓練のために世界中で使用されている。CRMは，無
意識のうちに欧米文化に偏っているとして，これまで批判を受けて来ている。本論は，CRM開発から
の歩み，および基盤となっている文化的前提を記述するものである。本論では，ホール，ホフステード，
トロンペナールス，ジンにより提唱された四つの文化的モデルを用いて，それぞれのモデルがCRM訓
練に与える含意を調査する。本論は，全ての国際線運航に関わるが，乗員編成が複数の国籍にまたがる
運航には特に深く関係するものである。
 Crew resource management (CRM) is an important airline training tool that was developed in the United 
States and has been used to train flight crews worldwide since the 1990s. CRM has been criticised for being 
implicitly biased towards Western culture. This paper describes the development of CRM and the cultural 
assumptions on which it is based. The paper considers four cultural models developed by Hall, Hofstede, 
Trompenaars and Jing, and examines the implications they present for CRM training. This study is relevant 
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1.   Introduction
 Awareness has grown in recent decades that 
many airline accidents have been at least partly 
caused by cultural factors (Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998; Jing & Batteau, 2015). For historical reasons, 
cultural factors form part of crew resource management 
(CRM), a training tool developed in the United 
States but now used by airlines around the world. 
This paper describes the development of CRM and 
the cultural assumptions informing it. Culture is 
inherently difficult to define, but in this analysis it 
denotes “the norms, attitudes, values, and practices 
that members of a nation, organization, profession, 
or other group of people share” (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 1996, p. 117). The paper considers 
four cultural models that have been applied to 
aviation, and examines the implications they 
present for CRM training. The goal is greater 
understanding of how cultural factors affect 
interpersonal interactions in the cockpit. This is an 
area of increasing relevance, given the sustained 
growth of airlines in the Middle East and Asia, 
especially China.
2.   A Brief History of CRM
2.1  The Birth of CRM
 CRM is a method of training airline crews that 
developed in the United States at the end of the 
1970s following several accidents involving 
American airlines. These accidents included: the 
1972 crash of Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 in the 
Florida Everglades; the 1977 runway collision 
between KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736 
at Tenerife; and the 1978 crash of United Airlines 
Flight 173 near Portland. The last of these, in which 
the crew were so absorbed with a landing gear 
problem that they did not realise the fuel was 
running out, is often cited as the most important 
trigger for the creation of CRM (Ginnett, 1993). 
Each of these accidents was complex and unique, 
but they all featured poorly functioning teams that 
combined overbearing captains with junior officers 
unable to articulate their concerns.
 In 1979, NASA organized a workshop for 
researchers and industry representatives to discuss 
the concept of flight deck resource management. In 
the opening presentation, chairman John Lauber 
reviewed relevant research: interviews conducted 
by NASA with airline pilots; a simulator study 
involving flight crews from an American airline; a 
study of 62 airline accidents; and a study of 250 jet 
transport incidents (Cooper, White & Lauber, 
1980). This seminal workshop addressed a very 
real problem, but it is important to note that most 
of the research focused on American flight crews. 
In other words, there was limited cultural diversity 
in the data underpinning the establishment of CRM.
2.2  The Evolution of CRM
 Following the 1979 conference, CRM training 
was adopted by American airlines and subsequently 
spread worldwide. Maurino and Murray (2010) 
describe six generations in its evolution. One of the 
early developments was a name change in the 
1980s from Cockpit Resource Training to Crew 
Resource Training in order to emphasize team 
dynamics and interactions with personnel outside 
the cockpit, such as dispatchers and air traffic 
controllers (ATC). In the 1990s increased emphasis 
was placed on cross-cultural issues in the model 
developed at the University of Texas, based on 
organisational research conducted by Geert 
Hofstede. More recently, the latest manifestations 
of CRM have an explicit focus on managing threats 
and errors.
 There have been many changes to CRM over the 
to all international flight operations, especially those involving mixed-nationality flight crews.
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last four decades, but the fundamental goal remains 
the same: to train crews in techniques that enable 
them to work as effective teams and avoid 
problematic behaviour patterns identified by 
accident research. Modern CRM programs typically 
cover the following skill areas: (a) communication/
interpersonal skills; (b) situation awareness; (c) 
problem-solving/decision-making/judgement; (d) 
leadership/followership; (e) stress management; 
and (f) critique (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002). In 
addition to its use in aviation, CRM training has 
now spread to a number of other high reliability 
industries such as healthcare, firefighting services, 
nuclear power generation, maritime and rail 
transport, and the offshore oil and gas industries 
(Flin, O’Connor & Crichton, 2008; Harris, 2014).
2.3  Limitations of CRM
 In terms of its longevity and worldwide usage, 
CRM has undoubtedly been a success. However, 
two extensive reviews of studies that evaluated 
CRM training were unable to determine whether 
there was any impact on organizational safety 
(Salas, Burke, Bowers & Wilson, 2001; Salas, 
Wilson, Burke & Wightman, 2006). Proponents of 
CRM point to cases when lives were saved, most 
notably the 1989 crash landing of United Airlines 
Flight 232 at Sioux City. This aircraft’s crew made 
a remarkable landing despite losing all flight 
control surfaces, with the captain later observing 
they would not have survived without the use of 
CRM techniques (Haynes, 1991).
 Notwithstanding the successes, a number of 
limitations of CRM have been identified over the 
years. Criticism has included the following: early 
programs relied on organisational training activities 
with l i t t le  relevance to air l ine operat ions 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998); as team dynamics 
became more prominent, CRM was labelled “a 
form of ‘New Age’ brainwashing aimed at 
achieving group harmony” (Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998, p. 146); the integration of CRM techniques 
with technical flying skill training led to increased 
proceduralization, reducing the focus on leadership 
and team building skills (Helmreich, Wilhelm, 
Klinect & Merritt, 2001); and the expanded range 
of program content obfuscated the overall goals 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).
 A further persistent criticism is that CRM is 
implicitly biased towards Western culture (Hisam 
& Hampton, 1996; Engle, 2000). In the 1980s, 
there was a common belief that CRM could, with 
minor changes, be adapted for use by any airline in 
the world, but this view of “culture-free CRM” has 
now been discredited (Maurino & Murray, 2010). 
Problems associated with implementing CRM in 
other countries,  such as the translation of 
specialized vocabulary and the use of feedback 
questionnaires on personality or working styles, 
were highlighted by Johnston (1993). He cautioned 
that the underlying causes of aviation accidents 
may vary by region, and that detailed research was 
required before CRM was applied worldwide.
 Criticism continues to this day. Analysing survey 
data from Taiwan and accidents involving Asian 
airlines, Jing and Batteau (2015) concluded that 
CRM is underpinned by cultural values alien to 
Chinese society, and moreover these differences are 
compounded by the increasing technological 
complexity of modern airliners. With such 
comments in mind, this paper examines four 
cultural models and the implications they pose for 
CRM training.
3.   Four Cultural Models
3.1  Hall’s Hidden Culture
 In a career spanning most of the twentieth 
century, the anthropologist Edward T. Hall 
identified numerous ways in which culture informs 
human behaviour. He noted that people remain 
largely unaware of this “hidden culture” because it 
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operates below the level of consciousness. 
Discussing the relevance of Hall’s research to CRM 
training, Hisam and Hampton (1996) provided 
examples of how pilots from various countries act 
differently. American pilots, for example, soon start 
addressing each other using first names whereas 
Europeans tend to remain more formal. The 
following paragraphs describe specific implications 
for CRM arising from three of Hall’s concepts.
3.1.1   H igh-Contex t  and  Low-Contex t 
Communications
 Hall (1976) contrasted high-context cultures, for 
example Japan, where relationships are deep and 
information is shared using messages that are 
simple but rich in meaning, with low-context 
cultures, such as America, where people are not 
bonded so tightly and there is less distinction 
between insiders and outsiders. He cautioned that 
meetings between the two cultures could present 
problems. Hall applied these concepts to communication, 
stating that high-context communications are fast 
and efficient because pre-programmed information 
is in the receiver and setting, with minimal 
information in the transmitted message. By contrast, 
low-context communications encode most of the 
information in the message, with a minimal amount 
in the internal or external context.
 The concept of a high- or low-context culture is 
problematic because Hall stated that, at least within 
France and Japan, a given person may have both 
high- and low-context aspects depending on the 
situation. Scollon, Scollon and Jones (2012) 
resolved this dilemma by proposing that the 
concept be applied not to entire national groups, 
but instead to particular speech events or situations. 
Consider, for instance, radio communications 
between pilots and ATC. These communications 
employ standard phraseology, a set of pre-
fabricated phrases for typical flight situations. 
Considerable time must be spent training personnel 
to use this system, but the payoff is high-context 
communications, enabling the quick and efficient 
exchange of information.
 It may be hypothesized that people who favour 
low-context communications require more extensive 
programming to use standard phraseology 
effectively. There is some evidence, albeit limited, to 
support this idea. In an analysis of a radio exchange 
reported by Kim and Elder (2009, p. 23.11), 
experienced Korean pilots and controllers described 
an American pilot’s “verbosity and inappropriate 
word choice… when phraseology would have 
sufficed” as “typical of native English-speaking 
aviation personnel”.
3.1.2   Monochronic and Polychronic Views of Time
 A second cultural scale described by Hall (1983) 
differentiated between monochronic people, who 
like to do one thing at a time, and polychronic 
people, who prefer doing several different activities 
at once. Hall again noted that interactions between 
the two categories may be problematic, with 
monochronic people liable to be disorientated when 
confronted by polychronic behaviour. This has 
implications for flight crew composition: for 
example, a monochronic American captain and a 
polychronic Latin American first officer may 
approach the same set of tasks differently. In the 
context of international business, Hall (1969) 
suggested that office design could ameliorate such 
problems, but at present this is not an option for 
pilots operating in confined airliner cockpits.
 Hisam and  Hampton  (1996)  no ted  tha t 
monochronic people are vulnerable to interruptions. 
In airline operations it is commonplace for 
disturbances – such as unexpected calls from cabin 
crew or ATC – to put task completion at risk. Citing 
dozens of incidents in which American crews 
experienced disturbances, Loukopoulos, Dismukes 
and Barshi (2009) stressed the importance of CRM 
techniques for managing workload effectively. 
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Techniques for dealing with interruptions would 
appear to be especially important for monochronic 
personnel, but there is no research evidence to 
suppor t  t h i s .  I n s t rumen t s  fo r  measu r ing 
polychronicity have, however, been developed and 
applied to other organizational contexts (Bluedorn, 
2002).
3.1.3  Action Chains
 The action chain is a sequence of actions that 
two or more individuals carry out in order to 
complete a task. Action chains play a vital role in 
the cockpit both in the formulaic exchanges 
between pilots and ATC, and also in the form of 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), or written 
descriptions of tasks for each flight phase. Hall 
(1976) noted that monochronic people tend to focus 
on completing tasks, while polychronic people 
place more emphasis on maintaining good human 
relations. Misunderstandings may occur when 
monochronic and polychronic people work together 
on the same action chain.
 The 1990 crash of Avianca Flight 052 near New York 
provides an illustration of such a misunderstanding. 
Shortly before the crash, one of the Columbian 
flight crew commented that an American air traffic 
controller was angry. In an analysis of the accident, 
Helmreich (1994) interpreted this comment to 
indicate a failure to focus on the task of safely 
landing the plane. However, a polychronic 
interpretation suggests that the crew member was 
expressing concern with the human relations 
involved in the situation, rather than a lack of 
concern with the task of landing. CRM training in 
interpersonal skills should at the very least raise 
awareness of these different cultural perspectives.
3.2  Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions
 The social psychologist Geert Hofstede (1980; 
1983) investigated differences in national culture in 
a research programme that started in the 1960s. 
Applying factor analysis to data aggregated from 
surveys of 88,000 workers in 66 countries, four 
cultural dimensions were identified and numerical 
values calculated for each country on each 
dimension. With easy-to-comprehend national 
scores, seemingly validated by the huge amount of 
input data, Hofstede’s work has been influential in 
many fields including aviation. Indeed, it has been 
described as the third leg of the “three-legged stool 
upon which broad, systematic-oriented aviation 
safety and efficiency endeavors rest” (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998, p. xvii).
3.2.1   Application of Hofstede’s Model to Aviation
 Using test items and methodology adapted from 
Hofstede,  University of Texas researchers 
conducted surveys of airline crew attitudes in over 
20 countries. They found a strong correlation with 
Hofstede’s results for the dimensions of power 
distance and individualism-collectivism, with a 
weaker correlation for uncertainty avoidance 
(Helmreich et al., 2001). This research fed directly 
into fourth-generation CRM programs in the 1990s.
Helmreich (1994) used Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions to analyse the actions of the Columbian 
flight crew in the aforementioned crash of Avianca 
052. Since Columbia scores highly in power 
distance – the extent to which less powerful 
members of organisations accept unequal power 
distribution – he posited that the first officer and 
flight engineer were reluctant to suggest alternative 
courses of action to the captain. Columbia is also 
strongly collectivist ,  with people defining 
themselves through social groups rather than as 
individuals, which may have made the flight crew 
reluctant to declare an emergency and push 
themselves ahead of other crews they perceived to 
be in a similar situation. In addition, Columbia 
scores highly in uncertainty avoidance, and 
therefore the crew, instead of facing the ambiguity 
of discussing possible alternate airports, may have 
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preferred to simply follow the initial flight plan.
 Hofstede’s model appears to be of particular 
value in making sense of accidents featuring junior 
officers unable to voice concerns to experienced 
captains, such as the Avianca 052 crash or the 
accidents that led to the inception of CRM. It 
should be noted, though, that cockpit operations 
typically involve dyadic or triadic interactions, 
whereas Hofstede’s research was based on large-
scale surveys. As Hofstede (1994, p. 16) himself 
observed, claims made about national cultural 
characteristics are “common trends, but individuals 
may differ from them”. 
3.2.2  Limitations of Hofstede’s Model
 The limitations of Hofstede’s research have been 
widely documented. McSweeney (2002) challenged 
several underlying assumptions, such as the use of 
limited sets of survey respondents to represent 
national populations, and the identification of cultural 
dimensions through analysis of questionnaire 
responses. Analysing the political subtext of 
Hofstede’s methodology, Ailon (2008) cautioned 
against an uncritical application of the dimensions to 
other cultures. In a study of multicultural work teams, 
Aritz and Walker (2010) raised several questions: 
whether Hofstede’s data may be reliably applied to 
countries not included in the initial surveys (such as 
China); whether the data are applicable to other 
workforces or national populations, given that the 
survey participants were sales managers and 
engineers; and what insights the dimensions offer to 
everyday intercultural interactions, such as team 
decision-making.
 Within aviation, Hofstede’s model was criticised 
by Hutchins, Holder and Pérez (2002) on numerous 
counts, including: the absence of data regarding 
intra-country variability in the dimensions; the 
methodology used to determine the probes; the 
problem of translation effects in cross-cultural 
surveys; and the fundamental issue of how survey 
responses relate to cockpit operations. Hofstede 
responded to some of the criticism with further 
surveys that included East Asian participants, and 
with investigations of organisational culture and 
cultural differences within a single country. Two 
new cultural dimensions were identified, but the 
underlying methodology remains unchanged 
(Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010).
3.3  Trompenaars’ Waves of Culture
 During the 1980s and 1990s the management 
consultant Fons Trompenaars conducted large-scale 
surveys of cultural diversity in companies operating 
in 50 countries. From this data he developed a 
model with seven cultural dimensions describing 
relationships with people, time and the environment 
(Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997). This 
model has not been incorporated into CRM programs, 
although it has been used in a correlational study of 
airline accident rates and attitudes to authority 
(Jing, Lu & Peng, 2001).
 Trompenaars’ use of survey data to identify 
cultural differences is open to similar criticisms to 
those levelled at Hofstede’s work, but a point of 
difference is that Trompenaars draws on intercultural 
business anecdotes to contextualize the dimensions in 
interpersonal interactions. However, Trompenaars’ 
cultural dimensions are not conceptually distinct, and 
Hofstede (1996) claimed that only two could be 
confirmed statistically. There is also some overlap 
with other cultural models, with, for example, 
Trompenaars’ specific-diffuse dimension corresponding 
closely to Hall’s concept of high-context and low-
context. The following paragraphs discuss implications 
of two of the dimensions for CRM.
3.3.1  Individualism-Communitarianism
 Trompenaars’ individualism-communitarianism 
is similar to Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism, 
with both measuring the extent to which people 
regard themselves as individuals or part of a group. 
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To illustrate national differences in this dimension, 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, pp. 64-
65) described a “critical incident” in a factory 
owned by an American multinational where a 
Japanese worker made a “serious error” causing the 
loss of a production batch. After the work group 
accepted responsibility, the factory director – to the 
amazement of a Western investigator – did not try 
to identify or punish the errant worker because in 
Japanese culture the shame of letting the group 
down was punishment enough.
 Reluctance of individuals in communitarian 
cultures to openly accept responsibility for errors 
may impact on two aspects of the error management 
training that forms an important part of modern 
CRM programmes. Firstly, inside the cockpit 
individual crew members are trained to assertively 
communicate problems, including errors (CAA 
2002). Secondly, inside an organisation it is essential 
for employees to report errors as part of an effective 
“safety culture” (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). It is 
clear that attitudes to error vary significantly, which 
may necessitate different CRM solutions for 
different cultures.
3.3.2  Achievement-Ascription
 In achievement cultures, such as the United 
States, people are accorded status based on how they 
perform work and their recent accomplishments. By 
contrast, in ascription cultures, such as Japan or 
China, status is accorded based on age, kinship, 
gender, connections and educational record. Status 
is thus perceived very differently in different cultures, 
and this may affect leadership and communication in 
the cockpit.
 Status is integral to a person’s authority. One of 
the assumptions of CRM leadership training is that 
captains can learn how to establish an appropriate 
level of authority. Ginnett (1993) described three 
techniques used by effective captains: establish 
competence in the pre-flight briefing; disavow 
perfection in order to allow other crew members to 
take responsibility; and engage the crew during the 
briefing and group formation process. These 
techniques,  based on NASA research with 
American flight crews, may prove effective in 
achievement cultures but less so in ascription 
cultures where status is not related to work 
performance.
 If a large difference exists between the status of 
the captain and junior officers, then a steep 
authority gradient may result. This can create a 
barrier to communication, and has been identified 
as a causal factor in several accidents including the 
previously mentioned 1977 collision at Tenerife. 
CRM programmes teach polite assertiveness 
techniques to help junior officers overcome this 
problem, but these may not be effective in 
ascription cultures where status derives from 
intrinsic characteristics such as age and gender.
3.4  Jing’s Dragon
 In the 1990s, using a modified version of a 
questionnaire developed by Helmreich, Professor 
Hung-Sying Jing surveyed approximately 1,000 
pilots and managers at airlines in Taiwan, including 
a significant number of foreign pilots. The results 
highlighted differences between Chinese and 
foreign pilots in attitudes to interpersonal relations 
and authority (Jing & Batteau, 2015). Believing 
these differences could not be adequately explained 
by uni-dimensional concepts such as power 
distance, Jing developed a model to describe 
interpersonal relations and authority in Chinese 
culture.
3.4.1  Differentiated Order Model
 Drawing on research by the scholar Fei Xiao-
Tung, Jing outlined a differentiated order model to 
describe how the Chinese categorize people around 
them. This model has four levels of intimacy: kin, 
acquaintance, fellow and alien. According to the 
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model, Chinese pilots consider that: close family 
are kin; other Chinese pilots are acquaintances; 
other Chinese workers in the same company are 
fellows; and foreign workers in the same company 
are aliens. Jing and Batteau (2015) stressed that the 
structure is not fixed and individuals can change 
level, for example by marrying into a family or 
having a serious falling out. To this model of 
interpersonal relations, Jing added a description of 
the Chinese concept of authoritarianism, which is 
dominated by the father-son relationship and which 
for several thousand years has been symbolised by 
the dragon.
3.4.2  Implications of Jing’s Model for Aviation
 Jing has used the differentiated order model to 
analyse accidents involving Asian airlines, such as 
the 1995 crash of a TransAsia Airways ATR72 
aircraft in Taiwan. Immediately before the crash, 
the captain was talking to a cabin attendant in the 
cockpit, which distracted him from monitoring the 
aircraft’s status and disrupted communications with 
ATC. Jing and Batteau (2015, p. 30) suggested that 
the captain regarded the cabin attendant as an 
acquaintance but considered the air traffic controller 
to be a stranger, adding that “Every Chinese person 
would be inclined by instinct to attend to a friend 
first, not the stranger”. Western pilots may consider 
such behaviour a blatant dereliction of duty, but 
Jing’s work highlights the impact cultural factors 
can have on cockpit interactions. Interestingly, it 
also echoes Hall’s description of the way that 
polychronic people favour personal relations.
 This accident was curious in several regards: it 
occurred on New Year’s Eve; the plane was carrying 
no passengers; and the captain was actually junior to 
the first officer in terms of their previous air force 
service. With regard to training, it emphasizes the 
importance – even under unusual circumstances – 
of adhering to rules, such as the sterile cockpit rule, 
which prohibits non-essential speech when flying 
below 10,000 feet. As Hisam and Hampton (1996) 
n o t e d ,  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s  h a v e  d i f f e r i n g 
interpretations of a sterile cockpit, so CRM training 
should be tailored accordingly.
 Finally, regarding cockpit procedures, Jing and 
Batteau (2015) observed that Chinese pilots are 
conditioned by the non-linear ideographic Chinese 
language and therefore have difficulty following 
sequential SOPs. Jing and Batteau see this as one 
manifestation of a systematic problem whereby 
Chinese pilots are not culturally programmed to use 
either commercial aircraft or an air transport system 
largely designed by Westerners.
4.   Conclusion
 CRM training has proved enduring and successful, 
but its validity outside of Western cultures has been 
questioned. Elements of Hostede’s cultural model 
have been incorporated into CRM, and clearly have 
value for training Western pilots and analysing 
certain types of accident. However, both the model 
and its applicability to aviation have been criticised. 
The three other cultural models examined in this 
paper have not been incorporated into CRM. Each 
offers valuable insights into national characteristics, 
especia l ly  regarding di fferences  between 
Americans and East Asians. There have been 
repeated calls for the development of different 
versions of CRM for different regions of the world, 
“culturally calibrated” to the needs of target 
participants (Hisam & Hampton, 1996; Helmreich 
& Merritt, 1998; Maurino & Murray, 2010). 
Elements of each of these models could be 
incorporated into a modular CRM package.
 There are two broad areas for future research. 
Firstly, the studies presented at the 1979 workshop 
that launched CRM were extensive, but were 
largely limited to American crews and are now 
dated. There is a pressing need for a similar 
research effort covering all major regions of the 
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world that focuses on accidents involving cultural 
factors. This should incorporate ethnographic 
research including interviews and observations of 
flights and training (Hutchins et al., 2002). 
Secondly, several similarities between elements of 
the four models have been noted, which hints at the 
possibility of ultimately constructing a unified 
cultural model. This will require considerable 
further research into differences in national, 
regional, organizational and professional cultures.
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